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COMMENTS AND RESEARCH REPORTS

of all the ways and means at our disposal today.
These experts should also share in the responsibiliy
for fixing the date of release. Thus even the more
serious cases will be released after receiving intensive and deep-going treatment during two, three,
or four years, and only the practically incurable will
have to serve the very long sentences. The senile,
the seriously mentally deficient, and those with
organic brain damage or other serious illness disturbing their mental organisation and function
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should be kept in non-penal institutions as long as
necessary.
There should never be a court action against a
sex offender without a preceding social and medicopsychological examination, as the selection of the
right treatment and sentence is particularly important in these cases, and the danger of an emotional and vengeful attitude on the part of those
dealing with the offender is still greater here than
generally.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES

Carolyn B. Jaffe*
Abstractor

Accomplice Witnesses-De Gesualdo v. People,
364 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1961). See Prejudicial Conduct
by Prosecutor, infra.
Accomplice Witnesses-People v. Mangi, 176
N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1961). See Witnesses, infra.
Arrest-People v. Goss, 14 Cal. Rptr. 569 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1961). Defendant, a parolee, was convicted of grand theft. On appeal from the judgment
and from the order denying his motion for a new
trial, defendant contended that he had been detained for 27 days between arrest and arraignment,
in violation of CAL. PEN. CODE §825 (1955) and
CAL. CONST. art. I, §13. The District Court of
Appeal affirmed, holding that since as a parolee
defendant was under legal custody of the Department of Corrections and was subject to being taken
back within the prison at any time during his
parole (CAL. PEN. CODE §3056 (1955)), his detention was not illegal inasmuch as he was not "arrested" but had merely been transferred from
constructive to actual custody of the state.
Arrest-People v. Foster, 176 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y.
1961). The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's
conviction of third degree assault, committed upon
a New York city police officer while he was attempting to arrest defendant for disorderly conduct. On appeal, defendant contended that since
the misdemeanor of disorderly conduct had not
* Student, Northwestern University School of Law.

been committed in the officer's presence, the arrest
without a warrant was illegal, and consequently
she did not commit criminal assault but was within
her rights when she used reasonable force to resist
such arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that defendant's arrest was lawful, either because
the police officer witnessed the final phase of the
original assault which constituted defendant's
disorderly conduct, or because the victim of the
original assault had made a valid constructive
citizen's arrest before the police officer arrived on
the scene. Judge Fuld concurred in the result,
agreeing that the arrest was valid, but solely because of the first reason stated by the court. Three
judges dissented, stating that the evidence did not
support a finding that the officer witnessed any
part of the misdemeanor, and that actual physical
restraint of defendant is requisite to a valid
citizen's arrest.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Taglavorev. United
States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961). Defendant was
convicted of illegal possession of narcotics. On
appeal, he contended that evidence procured in
violation of his constitutional rights and admitted
over his objection was the basis of conviction. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that where a vice squad
inspector, who suspected that defendant was
connected with narcotics violations, swore out a
warrant for his arrest for traffic violations committed in the inspector's presence, search of
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defendant's person by officers serving the warrant
violated his constitutional rights, even though his
actions (attempting to destroy narcotics) upon
being searched may have constituted probable
cause to arrest him for a narcotics violation without a warrant, since the police had engaged in a
deliberate attempt to evade the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment by using a traffic arrest
warrant as an excuse to search defendant for
narcotics which they merely suspected he
possessed.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Woolan,
15 Cal. Rptr. 833 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Defendant
was convicted of conspiracy to commit forgery.
On appeal, defendant contended that the entry
into his office by one Williams for the purpose of
obtaining evidence for the police was unlawful, and
consequently no evidence derived therefrom should
have been admitted at the trial. The District
Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that since
Williams, a constant visitor at the office and a
confederate of defendant, had no duty to disclose
that his purpose in making the visit complained
of was to obtain evidence against defendant, his
entry with defendant's consent was lawful; that
where arresting officers saw that defendant possessed marked money which he had accepted from
Williams just prior to their peaceable entry, they
had reasonable grounds to arrest him; and hence
evidence derived from Williams' entry dnd from a
search by the officers incidental to -defendant's
arrest was properly admitted.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Ker, 15
Cal. Rptr. 767 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Defendants,
a husband and wife, were convicted of possession
of marijuana. On appeal from the judgment and
from an order denying their motion for a new trial,
defendants contended that evidence unlawfully
seized pursuant to an unlawful arrest without a
warrant had been admitted at the trial. The
District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that
where the arresting officers had been told of defendant husband's dealings in narcotics by an
informer known by them to be reliable, and had
observed a furtive transaction between defendant
husband and one Murphy, a known narcotics
offender, the officers had reasonable grounds to
believe that defendant husband had just secured
marijuana from Murphy and was committing the
felony of having it in his possession; that it was
lawful for the officers to secretly and quietly gain

entry to defendants' apartment by means of a key
provided by the manager, inasmuch as circumstances justified the reasonable belief that upon
warning of their imminent entry, defendants would
have destroyed the narcotics; and since the arrest
was valid, evidence seized during a reasonable
search pursuant thereto was admissible.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Aleria,
14 Cal. Rptr. 162 (Dist. CL App. 1961). Defendant
was convicted of possession of narcotics. On appeal,
defendant contended that a search of his hotel
room without a warrant as an incident to a valid
arrest without a warrant in the lobby of his hotel
was unreasonable, and consequently use against
him at the trial of contraband seized in defendant's
room as a result of the search was violative of his
constitutional rights. The District Court of Appeal
affirmed, holding that where immediately upon
arresting defendant in his hotel lobby for being
under the influence of narcotics, the police officers
took him up one flight of stairs and 20 to 30 feet
down the hall to his room, which they proceeded
to search, the search was reasonable and lawful as
incidental to arrest, since there was. such close
proximity of both distance and time of arrest and
search that they could be deemed a continuous
transaction; and hence evidence seized during the
valid search was properly admitted at defendant's
trial.
Assimilative Crimes Act-United States v.
Barner, 195 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. Cal. 1961). Defendant was charged by an information with
drunken driving on a highway within a United
States Air Force base, in"violation of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §13 (1959), insofar as
it incorporates CAL. Vx-zcr CODE §23102 (1960).
Moving the court to dismiss the information on
the ground that it failed to state facts constituting
an offense against the United States, defendant
contended that since the roadways on the air force
base were not open to the public, they were not
"highways" within the meaning of the California
statute. The District Court denied the motion,
holding that although those who have no business
upon the base may be barred from using them, the
roadways were "highways" covered by the state
statute since the public had a general right to use
them, subject to reasonable restrictions and regulations essentially the same as those properly imposed by a state in the exercise of its police power.
The court noted that the policy of the Assimilative
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Crimes Act is to afford to people on Federal enclaves the same protection that they would be
afforded in the surrounding territory.
-
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degree murder. On appeal from the judgment and
from an order denying his motion for a new trial,
defendant contended that his admissions and confessions should not have been admitted as evidence
Burden of Proof of Guilt-Ciccarelli v. People, since they had been induced by promises and
364 P.2d 368 (Colo. 1961). See Presumption of psychologial coercion. The Supreme Court of
Innocence, infra.
California affirmed, holding that where -defendant
was not taken before a magistrate within the time
Confessions-Bolger v. Cleary, 293 F.2d 368 required by statute, was denied counsel prior to
(2d Cir. 1961). The District Court enjoined de- and during interrogation, was told by a police
fendant, a state waterfront detective, from testi- officer that defendant's wife and mother might be
fying against plaintiff in state criminal proceedings subject to arrest, and was promised that if he conas to statements made by plaintiff during his fessed, the officer would try to get defendant's
illegal detention by federal officials with whom friends released, the circumstances complained of,
defendant had cooperated. See Bolger v. United either alone or in combination, did not render his
States, 189 F. Supp. 237 (S.D. N.Y. 1960), ab- subsequent admissions and confessions involuntary
stracted at 52 J. CrM. L., C. & P.S. 425 (1961).
as a matter of law; and consequently the trial court
On appeal, defendant contended that the order did not abuse its discretion when it admitted deconstituted an unwarranted federal interference fendant's admissions and confessions as evidence
with the administration of criminal justice by the with an instruction that the jury disregard them if
states. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
it found them to be involuntary.
affirmed, holding that the state official must be
enjoined in order to protect the integrity of the
Double Jeopardy-Cardenas v. Superior Court,
federal judicial process and to insure that federal 14 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1961). After the trial court
officials comply with 'the requirements of fair declared a mistrial, petitioner sought a writ of
criminal law administration. Relying on Rea v. prohibition to prevent further proceedings upon
United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), in which a an information charging him with possession of
federal narcotics agent was enjoined from testifying narcotics. He contended that any further proin a state prosecution as to evidence seized by him ceedings would place him in double jeopardy,
in an illegal search, the court reasoned that Rea since the mistrial had been granted on motion of
differed from the present case only with regard the prosecution over petitioner's objection. The
to the time at which federal-officials attempted to Supreme Court of California issued the writ, holdmake the results of their illegal activities available ing that where petitioner's motion for mistrial was
to the state. The court noted that the injunction joined in by the prosecutor, and petitioner's request
would be unnecessary if it were clear that the to withdraw his motion was denied, his plea of once
evidence involved were inadmissible in the state in jeopardy was valid, since the mistrial must be
proceeding under Mapp v. Ohio, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684 treated as having been granted on*motion of the
(1961), abstracted at 52 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 292 prosecution over petitioner's objection.
(1961). Judge Anderson dissented on the ground
that in light of Mapp v. Ohio, which in his opinion
Double Jeopardy-Peoplev. Friqson, 177 N.E.2d
dearly prohibited the admission of the evidence
.230 (Ill. 1961). After the state had accepted the
in question in a state prosecution, plaintiff's rights
jury, made an opening statement, and presented
were adequately protected by the state of New'
testimony of two witnesses, the trial court granted
York.
the state's motion for mistrial on the ground that
its peremptory challenges had been erroneously
Confessions-United States v. Richmond, 197 restricted. Defendant was subsequently convicted
F. Supp. 125 (D. Conn. 1961). Sep Right to Coun- of brglary at a second trial. On writ of error, he
sel, infra.
contended that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for discharge, made when the mistrial was
Confessions-Peoplev. Kendrick, 14 Cal. Rptr. declared, on the ground of autrefois acquit. The
13 (1961). Defendant was convicted of second Supreme Court of Illinois reversed, holding that
degree burglary, first degree robbery, and first
since under the facts and circumstances presented
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there was neither danger to public justice due to
restriction of the state's peremptory challenges,
nor manifest necessity for discharging the jury,
declaring a mistrial was an abuse of the trial court's
discretion; and consequently to protect his constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy, defendant should have been discharged after the
mistrial was declared.
Double Jeopardy-State v. Quintana, 364 P.2d
120 (N.M. 1961). Defendant was convicted of
armed robbery and grand larceny. On appeal, he
contended that the imposition of consecutive
sentences for his convictions amounted to double
punishment for the same offense in violation of
his constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy [N.M. CoNST. art. IT, §15]. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico remanded with directions to
vacate sentence imposed for larceny and affirmed
in all other respects, holding that although defendant was properly convicted of both armed
robbery and grand larceny, he could not consistently with the prohibition against double
jeopardy be punished for both crimes, since under
the evidence, which showed that the offenses arose
out of the same transaction and were part of a
single criminal act, the act of grand larceny was a
lesser offense necessarily included within the
greater offense of armed robbery, and because the
constitutional guarantee protects against double
punishment of as well as against multiple trials
for the same criminal act.
Drunken Driving-United States v. Barner, 195
F. Supp. 103 (N.D. Cal. 1961). See Assimilative
Crimes Act, supra.
Entrapment-Commonwealth v. Conway, 173
A.2d 776 (Pa. 1961). Defendant was convicted of
bookmaking. On appeal, he contended that the
trial court erred in instructing that the evidence
was insufficient to warrant a finding of entrapment.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed and
remanded, holding that where there was no evidence tending to show defendant's disposition to
commit the crime, and evidence offered by defendant suggested that the law enforcement officer
had persuaded defendant to place bets for her, the
defense of entrapment should have been submitted
to the jury.
Evidence-Dying Declarations-Connor v. State,
171 A.2d 699 (Md. 1961). Defendant was con-

victed of second degree murder for having run
over his former wife with an automobile. On appeal,
defendant contended that the trial court erroneously admitted the statement "It was no accident,"
made by his former wife to a police officer while
she was lying in the street waiting for an ambulance, inasmuch as the statement was an expression
of opinion, and because the victim was unaware of
her impending death. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland affirmed, holding that the "opinion
rule" has no application to dying declarations; and
that since before making the declaration the victim
had said, "Get a priest," and had repeatedly said,
"Take care of my baby," it was clear that although she had not explicitly so stated, she did
not expect to survive the injury.
Habeas Corpus-McNeal v.Culver, 132 So. 2d
151 (Fla. 1961). See Right to Counsel, infra.
Homicide-Persampieri v.Commonwealth, 175
N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1961). Petitioner was convicted
of manslaughter. On petition for writ of error, he
'contended that since suicide is not a crime, the
trial court erred in accepting his plea of guilty of
manslaughter pursuant to an indictment charging
him as a principal in the second degree to his
wife's suicide. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed, holding that where petitioner taunted his emotionally distraught wife,
told her where the gun was, loaded it for her, and
instructed her as to its use, petitioner was sufficiently reckless and without regard for the possible
consequence of his conduct that a manslaughter
conviction was justified.
Husband-Wife Privilege-People v. Melski,
176 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 1961). See Witnesses, infra.
"Implied Consent" Laws-The supreme courts
of three states have recently interpreted statutes
which deem that one who drives within the state
has consented to take chemical tests for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his
blood, and provide for the suspension or revocation
of the driver's license of one who refuses to submit
to such tests. In Pruchav.Dep't of Motor Vehicles,
110 N.W.2d 75 (Neb. 1961), the Supreme Court
of Nebraska held that its implied consent statute
was not repugnant to the privilege against selfincrimination, since the state and federal constitutional privileges protected only against the compulsion of oral testimony, or to the due process
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clause, since a license to operate an automobile
is a privilege rather than a property right. The
Supreme Court of North Dakota, in Timm v.
State, 110 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1961), held that the
type of test to be given is determined by the arresting officer, not by the person charged with
drunken driving, since to hold otherwise would
defeat the purpose of the statute. In State v.
Batterman, 110 N.W.2d 139 (S.D. 1961), the
Supreme Court of South Dakota held that a
motorist's consent to chemical tests is not invalidated by the fact that he was not informed of
the consequences of his exercise of the right to refuse to submit, so long as he was informed of
that right.
Kidnapping-Cotton v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 65 (1961). Petitioners brought prohibition
proceedings to challenge the jurisdiction of the
Superior Court to try them on an indictment
charging them with kidnapping, conspiracy to
commit kidnapping, and other offenses allegedly
committed during a riot arising out of a labor
union strike. They contended that the evidence
was insufficient to sustain the various counts' of the
indictment. Noting that the case was one of first
impression in California, the Supreme Court issued
a writ restraining respondent court from taking
proceedings other than dismissal as to the kidnapping counts, holding that where asportation of
victims by petitioners was the consequence of a
spontaneous altercation occasioned by the strike
and was incidental to assault and rioting, the
evidence did not sustain a finding of the illegal purpose or intent which must be coupled with asportation to constitute kidnapping under CAL. PEN.
CODE §207 (1955). In interpreting the statute,
the court relied on People v. Oliver, 12 Cal. Rptr.
865 (1961), abstracted at 52 J. CRier. L., C. &
P.S. 429 (1961).
Kidnapping-Cowan v. State, 347 S.W.2d 37
(Tenn. 1961). Defendant was convicted of kidnapping. On appeal, defendant contended that he
did not violate the applicable statute [TENN.
CODE ANn. §39-2601 (1955)] when he forcibly confined two teen-age couples in their car for seven
hours for the purpose of coercing one or both of the
girls to have sexual intercourse with him. Noting
that the case was one of first impression in the
state, the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed,
holding that forcible confinement by defendant,
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coupled with his intent to cause the victims to be
secretly confined, amounted to kidnapping under
the statute, since its policy is to secure the personal
liberty of citizens of the state.
Lesser Included Offenses-State v. Quintana,
364 P.2d 120 (N.M. 1961). See Double Jeopardy,
su ra.
Lie Detector Evidence-State v. Trimble, 362
P.2d 788 (N.M. 1961). Defendant was convicted
of incest. On appeal, he contended that the trial
court erred in admitting over his objection testimony of one Hathaway as to the results of a polygraph test conducted by Hathaway and voluntarily submitted to by defendant. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico reversed and remanded,
holding that since the results of polygraph tests
were inadmissible on the ground that their reliability is uncertain, the testimony should have
been excluded even though defendant had signed a
waiver agreeing to be bound by the results of the
test; and inasmuch as the inadmissible testimony
may well have been the decisive factor in the case,
defendant was entitled to a new trial.
Mann Act-Nelms v. United States, 291 F.2d
390 (4th Cir. 1961). Defendant was convicted
on two counts of violating the Mann Act [18
U.S.C. §2421 (1959)]. On petition to correct
illegal sentence, defendant contended that under
the facts developed at the trial, he had committed
but one offense when he transported his wife on a
round trip between two states for purposes of
prostitution. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed, holding that since the gravaman
of an offense under the Mann Act is the interstate
transportation,and since the number of separate
transportations determines the number of offenses,
defendant's round trip transportation of his wife
constituted two separate and distinct offen3es,
inasmuch as prostitution was the purpose of each
of the interstate transportations. The court distinguished the present case from those where an
interstate round trip begun for legitimate purposes
but subsequently becoming immoral cannot be
split into two parts to sustain a single offense.
Mayhem-State v. Bass, 120 S.E.2d 580 (N.C.
1961). Defendant, a physician, was convicted of
being an accessory before the fact to mayhem.
On appeal, defendant contended that when he
anesthetized the hand of the victim, one Rogers,
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and gave medical advice to him, knowing that
Rogers intended to have one Bryson cut off his
fingers in order to collect insurance money, defendant was not an accessory before the fact to
mayhem, since mayhem had not been committed
inasmuch as Rogers had requested that Bryson
maim him. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
affirmed, holding that under N.C. GEtq. STAT.
§14-29 (1953), consent of the victim is no defense
to mayhem. In reaching its conclusion the court
traced the development of the law of mayhem
from its early English origins to the present North
Carolina statute.
Prejudicial Conduct by Prosecutor-De Gesualdo
v. People, 364 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1961). Defendant was
convicted of burglary and of conspiring with one
Ciccarelli to commit burglary. [The transaction
was the same one for which Ciccarelli was later
tried and convicted. See Presumption of Innocence,
infra.] On writ of error defendant contended that
his rights were prejudiced when the trial court
allowed the district attorney to call Ciccarelli to
the stand for the purpose of extracting from him a
claim of privilege against self-incrimination, inasmuch as the jury may have considered it as an
incriminating fact against defendant. The Supreme
Court of Colorado reversed and remanded, holding
that where it was known to the trial court and the
district attorney that criminal charges were pending against Ciccarelli and that he did not intend
to turn "state's evidence," the district attorney's
conduct in calling him as a witness for the state
was a calculated attempt to bring to the jury's
attention Ciccarelli's claim of privilege; and since
the trial court neither prevented the prejudicial
conduct nor cautioned the jury to draw no
inference of defendant's guilt therefrom, defendant's rights were prejudiced to the extent that
he was entitled to a new trial.
Presumption of Innocence--Ciccardliv. People,
364 P.2d 368 (Colo. 1961). Defendant was convicted of burglary. On writ of error, he contended
that the trial court's instruction that "exclusive
and unexplained possession of property recently
stolen raises the presumption that he who is in
such possession is guilty of. the theft; the burden
of explaining such possession is upon the defendant,
and his explanation must be sufficient to raise in
your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt...."
was prejudicially erroneous, in that it shifted to
defendant the burden of proving his innocence in

violation of the fundamental rule that the prosecution always has the burden of proving guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court of
Colorado affirmed, holding that the effect of the
instruction was not to prejudicially shift the burden
of proof of innocence to defendant, but to properly
require him to bear the onus of making an explanation sufficient to rebut the presumption of guilt
which arose from recent possession of stolen goods
by raising a reasonable doubt in the minds of the
jury as to his guilt. The court distinguished the
present instruction from those which have constituted reversible error on the ground that they required proof of innocence to successfully rebut
the presumption of guilt.
Promises of Leniency-People v. Bannan,
110 N.W.2d 673 (Mich. 1961). Petitioner was convicted of breaking and entering in the nighttime.
On petition for writ of habeas corpus, he contended
that where the defense attorney stated to the trial
court, "[Tihe prosecuting attorney ...informs me
that ... he would not be opposed to probation

with a six months' jail term; and the defendant
wishes to enter a plea of guilty. .. .", the trial

court should not have accepted petitioner's plea
without first exploring, the statement in detail to
determine that the plea had been voluntarily made
rather than in reliance upon any promise of leniency, and consequently that petitioner should be
released from a much more severe sentence.
Analogizing the present case to cases of self-conviction by means of coerced confessions, and stating
that due process is violated in both situations, the
Supreme Court of Michigan set aside the conviction and sentence, and remanded petitioner for
further proceedings, holding that since enough was
said by defense counsel in open court to warrant
one of petitioner's lack of education, low mentality,
and unfamiliarity with court procedures to fairly
and reasonably conclude that a bargain had in fact
been made, it was the duty of the prosecutor to
clarify the matter, and of the court to determine
whether petitioner's plea of guilty was made in
reliance upon the promise of leniency presumed by
petitioner to have been made; and that since these
duties were not discharged, petitioner was entitled
to a trial on the merits. The court noted that where
a defendant pleads guilty in reliance on a statement made by the prosecutor or judge which,
fairly interpreted by the defendant, is a promise
of leniency, and the promise is not kept, the plea
may be withdrawn.
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Promises of Leniency-People v. Mangi, 176
N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1961). See Witnesses, infra.
Right to Counsel-United States v. Richmond,
197 F. Supp. 125 (D. Conn. 1961). After the district court discharged petitioner's application for
writ of habeas corpus for release from confinement
under sentence of death on a state conviction of
murder, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded to the district court for rehearing
on the entire state court transcript. On rehearing,
petitioner contended that the use at his trial of
confessions which he had made after being formally accused of murder, while he was in ignorance of his rights and without benefit of counsel,
constituted a violation of due process. The district
court ordered that petitioner be released, allowing
the state to retry him, if it wished, within a reasonable time, holding that where petitioner, a 19year-old Negro of limited intelligence with little
education and ignorant of his legal rights, was
charged with a capital offense, the state trial court
was under a duty to inform him of his right to
counsel and to provide counsel if petitioner proved
to be indigent; and that confessions, albeit voluntary, which were obtained while petitioner was
deprived of his right to counsel were inadmissible
under the circumstances, and their use against
petitioner violated his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process of law.
Right to Counsel-McNeal v. Culver, 132 So.2d
151 (Fla. 1961). Petitioner was convicted of assault
to commit murder in the second degree. After
the Supreme Court of Florida dismissed his application for writ of habeas corpus without a hearing,
the United States Supreme Court, on certiorari,
reversed and remanded to the Florida Supreme
Court, directing that the state court conduct a
hearing to determine the truth of petitioner's
allegations regarding denial of counsel, since if
they were found to be true, due process would
compel that the writ be granted. See-Right to
Counsel-McNeal v. Culver, 81 Sup. Ct. 413
(1961), abstracted at 52 J. Cium. L., C. & P.S.
300 (1961). Upon a full hearing 9f his allegations,
the Supreme Court of Florida iemanded petitioner
to the Criminal Court for a new trial, holding that
although allegations concerning his request for
and the trial court's denial of counsel were false,
petitioner's trial at which he was not represented
by counsel was fundamentally unfair, since due to
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lack of education, mental illness, and unfamiliarity
with court procedure, he was in fact unable to
effectively conduct his defense, and was unaware
of his constitutional right to counsel.
Robbery-Smith v. United States, 291 F.2d 220
(9th Cir. 1961). Defendants were convicted of
bank robbery. On appeal, they challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence to establish a necessary
element of the crime, contending that there could
have been no trespass since the bank, knowing of
the planned robbery attempt, submitted and consented thereto. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the taking
constituted a trespass without consent of the
bank, since in failing to attempt to prevent defendants from taking the money, the bank merely
allowed the crime to be committed in order that
defendants could be apprehended in the act and
did not consent to their taking the money with the
intent to grant right of possession to defendants.
Search and Seizure-United States v. Merrill,
293 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1961). Defendant was convicted of a narcotics violation. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying
her motion to suppress, since the evidence which
established her guilt had been obtained as a result
of an illegal search and seizure. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that since the search warrant
provided for service in the daytime, it was legally
invalid when served at night; and consequently
the officers' entry into defendant's apartment was
unlawful, and the fruits of their ensuing search
were inadmissible.
Search and Seizure-People v. Kelly, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 177 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Defendant, a
university student, was convicted of burglary. On
appeal, he contended that the triil court erred in
admitting, over his objection, evidence seized as
the result of an unlawful search of his dormitory
room. The District Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that where the officers had reasonable
cause to believe that defendant was involved in
the burglaries, and where it was implicit iii dormitory rules that defendant had agreed that the
university's Master of Student Houses might enter
the room in the perfornfance of his duties, search
of defendant's room in the company of the master
was lawful albeit without a warrant and prior to
defendant's arrest, since the officers believed in
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good faith that the situation confronting them
was an emergency which, under dormitory rules,
would justify the master's entry into the room.
Self-Incrimination-Glotzbach v. Klavens, 196
F. Supp. 685 (E.D. Va. 1961). The District
Director of Internal Revenue sought an order
directing respondents, one Glotzbach and his
attorney, to turn over to Internal Revenue agents
certain books and records in custody of the attorney. Respondents contended that although
Kiavans had previously made the records available
to Internal Revenue agents voluntarily and with
full knowledge of his constitutional rights, he
nevertheless could subsequently assert his Fifth
Amendment immunity privilege. Noting that the
case seemed to be one of first impression, the
District Court entered the order, holding that the
general rule [that a witness is estopped from asserting his constitutional immunity to avoid further
disclosure which may fairly tend to incriminate
him, and must make full disclosure, where the
previous disclosure was an actual admission of
guilt or incriminating facts, but that he is not so
estopped or compelled where the previous disclosure was not of such nature] did not apply,
since in turning over the records originally, Klavans
had made full disclosure with regard to those
records, and consequently his Fifth Amendment
privilege could not be asserted in the same proceeding [i.e., the investigation of Klavans' records]
in which it had been waived.

Speedy Trial-State v. Hale, 172 A.2d 631 (Me.
1961). Defendant was convicted of having taken
indecent liberties with a 14-year-old boy. On
appeal, defendant contended that the trial court
should have granted his motion to quash the indictment on the ground that he had been denied a
speedy trial. The Supreme Court of Maine
affirmed, holding that where delay in commencement of trial was due to the fact that defendant
had been a fugitive from justice [since he fled the
state after having incurred guilt therein], he
waived his right to be tried during that period,
even though he was unaware that an indictment
was pending against him; and that the state was
under no duty to inform him of the pendency of
the indictment, since arrest was a prerequisite to
such disclosure, and since as a fugitive he was not
entitled to speedy arrest or extradition.

Witnesses-People v. Mangi, 176 N.E.2d 86
(N.Y. 1961). Denial by the Court of General
Sessions of defendant's petition for writ of error
coram nobis to vacate.judgment of conviction for
violation of N.Y. PsE. LAws §1751(2) and (3)
(1950) was affirmed by the Appellate Division.
On appeal by permission, defendant contended
that his trial was unfair, since the jury was unaware of facts affecting the credibility of an accomplice witness whose testimony constituted a large
part of the state's case. The Court of Appeals of
New York sustained thp writ and remanded
defendant for a new trial, holding that where one
Gordon, an accomplice witness under indictment
during defendant's trial, testified that no promise
had been made to induce him to testify favorably
for the state, when in fact the District Attorney
had told Gordon that if he would cooperate the
District Attorney would call such cooperation to
the attention of the court and would request
leniency in sentencing Gordon, and Gordon in
fact relied on this promise, the prosecutor of
defendant's trial should have so informed the
jury, inasmuch as Gordon's credibility may well
have been a decisive factor in reaching the verdict.
Noting that it did not imply that -the prosecutor
deliberately intended to mislead the jury, the
court stated that intent of the prosecutor to influence the outcome of the trial was immaterial to
disposition of defendant's appeal.

Witnesses-People v. Melski, 176 N.E.2d 81
(N.Y. 1961). Defendant's conviction of grand
larceny in the second degree was affirmed by the
Appellate Division. On appeal by permission,
defendant contended that his wife should not have
been allowed to testify against him over his
objection. The Court of Appeals of New York
affirmed, holding that since the statute [N.Y.
PEN. LAWS §2445 (1950)], deems privileged only
those communications which were made in confidence and would not have been made but for the
marital relationship, defendant's wife was properly
permitted to testify as to a communication concerning the presence in their home of defendant's
accomplices, inasmuch as it was made in the presence of the accomplices and was not induced by
the marital relationship. Three judges dissented
on the ground that in their opinion, the communication was confidential and consequently privileged by the statute.

